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94 
Reply 
On Silence: 
A Reply to Professors Cribari and Judges 
Ted Sampsell-Jones† 
  INTRODUCTION   
I thank Professors Cribari and Judges for taking the time 
to respond to Making Defendants Speak.1 Their Response, 
Speaking of Silence,2 makes many thoughtful and impassioned 
arguments. To a substantial extent, however, their Response is 
not directed at me, but rather at the likes of Judge Henry 
Friendly3 and Professor Albert Alschuler,4 who have offered 
more thoroughgoing critiques of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
itself. Cribari and Judges characterize me as an “abolitionist,”5 
and suggest that my “real aim” is the Self-Incrimination Clause 
itself.6 In that respect, they misread my article. I do not pro-
pose outright repeal; rather, in addition to other proposals that 
do not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause, I propose over-
ruling Griffin v. California.7 In my view, the Griffin rule 
represents an unwise and constitutionally unwarranted judicial 
 
†   Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks 
to Gregory Duhl for his suggestions. Copyright © 2010 by Ted Sampsell-Jones. 
 1. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1327, 1327 (2009). 
 2. Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, Speaking of Silence: A Response to 
Making Defendants Speak, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 11 (2009), http://www 
.minnesotalawreview.org/sites/default/files/Judges_Cribari_Speaking_of_Silence 
.pdf.  
 3. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for 
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 674–77 (1968). 
 4. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: 
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 (1996). 
 5. Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 39. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
prohibits instructions and comments suggesting that an adverse inference can 
be drawn from a defendant’s silence). 
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extension of the Clause, so it should be abandoned. But aban-
doning Griffin does not mean abandoning the core right itself. 
The Self-Incrimination Clause, at its core, prohibits the use 
of torture to obtain confessions from a suspected criminal.8 It 
also prohibits the use of imprisonment and contempt sanctions 
to compel a suspect to offer testimonial evidence against him-
self.9 The Griffin rule—which prohibits adverse inferences from 
silence at trial10—is, in my view, a peripheral extension of the 
right to remain silent. I propose lopping off that judicially 
created extension, but I do not thereby propose to abolish it. 
To use a (very) rough sports metaphor, think of the two po-
lar rights—the right to testify and the right to remain silent—
as the opposite end zones of a football field. Between the end 
zones, there is a large field that provides room for play with 
various legal rules that affect a defendant’s decision to testify 
or remain silent. Currently, the line of scrimmage is set at the 
forty-yard line closest to the silence end zone. I propose moving 
the line of scrimmage to the opposite forty-yard line. I do not 
propose moving the ball all the way to the end zone. There are 
important values underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause, but 
there are competing values as well. The current body of Ameri-
can case law represents an attempt (though not an explicit or 
thoughtful attempt) to balance competing values. I think that 
the current balance is a bit off, while Cribari and Judges ap-
pear to think that the current balance is about right.  
More concretely, their defense of Griffin has two main 
threads. First, they argue that Griffin is justified by a “test the 
prosecution” theory of modern criminal trial11 and also by the 
Self-Incrimination Clause itself.12 Second, they argue that Grif-
fin is justified by intuitions about what prosecution practices 
are reasonable and appropriate.13 For the reasons that follow, I 
find neither argument persuasive. Ultimately, I suspect their 
defense of Griffin has little to do with any interpretive theory of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause. Rather, Cribari and Judges 
seem to be motivated by a sense that the modern criminal jus-
 
 8. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2651 (explaining that the history 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause indicates that it was designed to prohibit 
coercive interrogation techniques, including torture). 
 9. See id. 
 10. 380 U.S. at 615. 
 11. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 13. 
 12. See id. at 14–15. 
 13. See id. at 36–37. 
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tice system is unfair to criminal defendants, and thus that any 
change that would benefit the state must be resisted. By con-
trast, I conclude that maintaining Griffin does nothing to rem-
edy the injustices or iniquities of contemporary criminal law. 
I.  “TESTING THE PROSECUTION”   
Cribari and Judges argue that the expansive modern police 
state—and the resulting “test the prosecution” theory of mod-
ern trial—necessitates the Griffin rule.14 They reject the use of 
history to guide interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
because the criminal justice system has changed so dramatical-
ly since the Founding Era.15 They argue that the expansion in 
the state’s power to prosecute over the last two centuries justi-
fies new offsetting rights—rights needed to test the state’s 
case—and that Griffin is one such right.16  
Their argument has several shortcomings. To begin with, it 
rests on an overwrought historical story. They suggest that 
over the last two centuries, the American criminal law has been 
transformed from a small, somewhat idyllic system into an Or-
wellian leviathan.17 But the history of American criminal law is 
not a history of relentless linear expansion. Indeed, in many 
ways, the criminal law is narrower in scope than it was in the 
past. States impose the death penalty less frequently and for 
fewer crimes.18 Many “morals” crimes have been deregulated.19 
The overall numbers of criminal prosecutions and prisoners 
have risen dramatically, of course, but that is in large part be-
cause crime rates themselves have risen dramatically.20 Mur-
der was illegal in 1791 as it is today; what has changed is that 
 
 14. Id. at 13. 
 15. Id. at 15–16. 
 16. See id. at 48. 
 17. See id. at 26 (“The extensive and complex web of today’s federal, state, 
and local criminal laws, and malum prohibitum regulatory provisions enforced 
by criminal sanctions, would have been unimaginable in the eighteenth cen-
tury.”). 
 18. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 42–44 (discussing the imposition of capital punishment in colonial 
America against repeat offenders and for crimes including, but not limited to, 
rape and murder). 
 19. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that the standard historical story that 
there has been a relentless increase in the scope of the criminal law is a myth). 
 20. See id. at 267 (explaining that the increase in incarceration rates de-
rives from decisions to punish offenders more severely). 
  
2010] ON SILENCE 97 
 
people do it more often.21 Thankfully, the state has increased 
the supply of murder prosecutions to match the growth in de-
mand. Such expansion does not provide any justification for al-
tering the scope of defendants’ procedural rights. 
History aside, the “test the prosecution” theory of defen-
dants’ rights does not offer a cogent account of the wide variety 
of procedural and evidentiary rules that characterize the con-
temporary criminal justice system. To begin with, it is not even 
clear whether the “test the prosecution” label can be sensibly 
applied to Griffin or many of the other procedural protections 
afforded to defendants. Some rights are sensibly called “test-
ing” rights. The right of confrontation, for example, allows a de-
fendant to test the prosecution’s case by cross-examining the 
prosecution’s witnesses. But the Self-Incrimination Clause does 
not allow a defendant to test anything—rather, it allows a de-
fendant to withhold evidence that the prosecution might oth-
erwise be able to obtain and admit at trial. Even at the level of 
characterization, calling Griffin a “test the prosecution” rule is 
awkward. 
Even setting aside such qualms about labels, the “test the 
prosecution” theory is inadequate because it cannot explain 
why we have certain testing practices rather than others. 
Wouldn’t a beyond any doubt standard test the prosecution bet-
ter than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard? If so, why do 
we have the latter instead of the former? Wouldn’t a defendant 
be better able to test the prosecution if the state were required 
to disclose every detail of its case well in advance of trial? And 
wouldn’t a defendant be better able to test the prosecution if he 
were not required to make any pretrial disclosures at all? If so, 
how can contemporary discovery practices be reconciled with 
the “test the prosecution” theory?  
We could draft and propose countless new legal rules that 
would help criminal defendants test the prosecution’s case. But 
many such rules would not be sensible. Some rules that test the 
prosecution are justified, but others are not, in part because 
their cost would be too high. Even as a policy matter, therefore, 
a rule, such as the Griffin rule,22 cannot be justified simply by 
noting that it helps defendants to “test the prosecution.” The 
“test the prosecution” theory offered by Cribari and Judges is so 
 
 21. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 270 (describing that the number of 
prisoners has increased since the 1900s). 
 22. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
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vague that it offers no real guidance about which practices 
should be adopted and which should not. 
As a legal matter, moreover, it is difficult to tie the “test 
the prosecution” theory to our constitutional text. The Consti-
tution does not say “in all criminal cases, the accused shall en-
joy the right to test the prosecution’s case.” Instead, it grants to 
criminal defendants a set of particular procedural rights—such 
as the right to confront witnesses, the right to the assistance of 
counsel, and the right to a jury trial.23 Cribari and Judges 
might deride me as a formalist,24 but I maintain that the Grif-
fin rule is constitutionally required if and only if it is mandated 
by some actual provision of the Constitution.25 Asserting that 
the Griffin rule helps to “test the prosecution” does little to an-
swer the constitutional question.26 
II.  REASON AND INTUITION   
Many legal rules exist that would help defendants test the 
prosecution, and many practices exist that would at least argu-
ably implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause. Ultimately, an in-
terpretive theory must provide some framework to help decide 
which practices are permissible and which are not. My frame-
work begins with the text of the Clause itself, and attempts to 
analyze which practices constitute “compulsion.” I propose that 
we should measure compulsion by reference to generally ap-
plicable rules of evidence and procedure. Applying that frame-
work, I conclude that an adverse inference drawn from silence 
at trial does not constitute compulsion. Cribari and Judges, by 
contrast, simply refer to the various values (drawn from Mur-
phy27) that can be said to underlie the Clause, and analyze 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 24. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST 
DIVIDE 161 (2010) (describing how jurists often use the term “formalist” as “a 
term of abuse with no real theoretical content”). 
 25. Professors Cribari and Judges also argue that Griffin is “consistent” 
with a “robust right to remain silent.” See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 
37. I suppose I have no quarrel with that proposition, but the relevant ques-
tion is whether the Griffin rule is mandated by the Self-Incrimination Clause.  
 26. Cf. Eric A. Posner, The Decider, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.tnr/com/print/book/review/the-decider (“Abstract propositions about 
human values cannot decide cases.”). 
 27. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 56 n.5 (1964) (describ-
ing the various values served by the Self-Incrimination Clause). 
  
2010] ON SILENCE 99 
 
whether the use of an adverse inference would undermine 
those values.28 
But just as their “test the prosecution” approach offers no 
concrete interpretive guidance, their appeal to Murphy’s values 
offers no concrete interpretive guidance. Murphy is a pastiche. 
It lists a myriad of different “fundamental values” and “noble 
aspirations” which the Self-Incrimination Clause is said to fur-
ther.29 Some of the “values” are exceedingly vague—I struggle 
to find any actual semantic content in phrases like “respect for 
the inviolability of the human personality.”30 An approach 
based on Murphy risks quick degeneration into sloganeering. 
And again, while there are innumerable legal practices that 
implicate the diffuse Murphy values to at least some extent, on-
ly some of those practices actually violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause. Even if the Murphy values provide an 
appropriate starting point, we would still need some framework 
for deciding which of those practices are unconstitutional and 
which are not. Cribari and Judges do not provide any such 
framework. Instead, they suggest that we may rely on intui-
tion.  
When it comes to Griffin, their intuition does not match my 
own. Our debate is about whether a prosecutor may stand up in 
closing and say: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in addition 
to the other evidence of guilt, you should consider the fact that 
the defendant has declined to testify.” While such an argument 
might not be very strong as an evidentiary matter, it does not 
strike me as being particularly unseemly or demeaning.31 If 
forced to debate in Murphy’s dissolute and wandering terms, I 
would have to say that I do not intuit any disrespect for the in-
violability of the human personality in such a closing argu-
ment.  
But intuition is a sorry substitute for law. Intuition alone 
cannot justify Griffin or anything else. Constitutional adjudica-
tion requires more than intuition—it requires reason.  
The scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not easy to 
define, and application of the Clause in modern criminal law 
raises a variety of difficult and debatable questions about vari-
ous investigatory and evidentiary practices. May the state 
 
 28. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 29–37. 
 29. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, 56 n.5. 
 30. Id. at 55. 
 31. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 36–37 (characterizing adverse 
inferences as “unseemly”). 
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compel a defendant to answer questions on cross-examination 
once he has testified on direct? May the state compel a defen-
dant to turn over documents or other physical evidence?32 May 
the state compel a suspect to answer questions if it gives him 
only testimonial, rather than transactional, immunity?33 The 
Supreme Court’s case law must answer these questions and 
give legal reasons for its answers. The Court cannot strike 
down a legal rule as unconstitutional simply by calling it “un-
seemly.” 
  CONCLUSION   
Judging by the tenor of Speaking of Silence, I suspect that 
Cribari and Judges are not much concerned with any argu-
ments about the text, history, and structure of the Constitu-
tion. Their arguments are more extralegal than legal. Their de-
fense of Griffin draws much of its rhetorical force from the 
emotional picture they draw of the poor and lonely defendant 
who faces the powerful and menacing state.34 It would be easy 
to respond in kind with an emotional appeal about the horrible 
toll that crime takes on victims, and about the necessity of de-
terring, punishing, and incapacitating the men (and occasional 
women) who commit crime. But that road leads nowhere good. 
After all, Cribari and Judges are correct that the contem-
porary American criminal justice system is awesome in its 
scope and in its power. The sheer number of incarcerated 
American citizens—which presently hovers above two mil-
lion35—is staggering. Even considering our high crime rates, 
our incarceration rates are indefensible.36  
 
 32. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 56 (2000) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Court should reconsider its doctrine that the Clause 
only applies to “testimonial” evidence). 
 33. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972) (holding that 
testimony can be compelled from a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment 
by conferring immunity from use of the compelled testimony and evidence de-
rived from it in subsequent criminal proceedings). 
 34. See Judges & Cribari, supra note 2, at 35–36. 
 35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
228417, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 1 (2009); see also John Schwartz, Report Finds 
States Holding Fewer Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A15 (noting 
that state and federal prisons currently hold approximately 1.6 million people, 
and local jails currently hold approximately 700,000). 
 36. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISH-
MENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3–6 (2003) 
(analyzing the comparatively harsh sentencing practices of contemporary Amer-
ican criminal law).  
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But it is important to locate the source of that problem. 
The criminal justice system has different spheres. In one 
sphere, substantive criminal law and sentencing law define 
what acts are illegal and how much they are punished. In 
another sphere, evidence law and criminal procedure create 
and regulate our system for deciding whether an accused indi-
vidual is guilty or not. The scope of the American criminal jus-
tice system is daunting, but that problem results from substan-
tive law and sentencing law, not from evidence and procedure. 
In other words, the problem is not that we are locking up many 
innocent people, but that we are locking up guilty people for too 
long. A better criminal justice system might have fewer crimes, 
and it might have shorter sentences. But that question is inde-
pendent of the diagnostic question—we should always strive to 
have the most accurate system possible for determining who is 
guilty and who is not.  
Substantive law and sentencing law are predominantly po-
litical, while evidence law and procedure are more classically 
legal. As lawyers, we have very little power over substantive 
and sentencing law, but we have some power in the sphere of 
evidence and procedure. It is tempting, as a means of protest-
ing the injustices of substantive and sentencing law, to fight 
any legal reform in evidence or procedure that would provide a 
marginal benefit to the state. That temptation should be re-
sisted. Maintaining a constitutionally shoddy rule like Griffin 
does nothing to remedy the injustices of modern American 
criminal law. 
 
 
